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JOHN C. MERINGOLO
The Media, the Jury, and the High-Profile 
Defendant: A Defense Perspective on the 
Media Circus
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No. 03 CR 285 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2004). Such experience provided Mr. Meringolo instant exposure to 
high-profile criminal defense. Over the last seven years of Mr. Meringolo’s private practice, he has tried 
numerous high-profile cases, including: United States v. DePalma, No. 05 CR 225 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 
2006), United States v. Boyle, No. 03 CR 970 (SJ) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005), Indictment, People v. Lucente, 
No. 490-09 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010), and, as discussed later in this article, United States v. Gotti, No. 08 CR 
1220 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2009). Aside from practicing law, Mr. Meringolo also teaches Trial Advocacy 
as an Adjunct Professor at New York Law School.
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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Throughout American history, there has been tension between the Sixth 
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to receive a fair trial and the First 
Amendment right for freedom of the press to publish news about criminal trials. 
Over the last seventy-five years in particular, media coverage of trials has steadily 
increased as a result of rapid advancements in technology. The increase in media 
coverage has led to the use of the term “high-profile” to define cases and defendants 
subjected to heightened media scrutiny. Initially, the use of cameras, and then 
television, in the courtroom triggered the heated constitutional debate over the 
proper balance of the First and Sixth Amendments. Beyond the traditional types of 
mass media, including newsprint and television reports, the Internet is a phenomenon 
that has rapidly and immeasurably changed the way in which the general public 
accesses information; its relative speed and broad, global reach portend an age where 
media has an even greater effect on juries in high-profile cases.
 Currently, when the public’s interest is sparked by a particular case, there are 
resources readily available. Such instantaneous availability is the cornerstone of the 
information age. The media extensively broadcasts pretrial coverage in high-profile 
cases, so much so that it becomes difficult for the public to avoid exposure to such 
information. Studies have sought to measure the degree to which continuous exposure 
to pretrial publicity prevents potential jurors from becoming fair and objective fact 
finders. Although there is disagreement as to the extent, social science research has 
shown a strong correlation between pretrial publicity and juror bias.1
 Some of the most common types of publicly disseminated information include 
negative statements about the suspect that are typically not supposed to be considered 
by the jury in the courtroom. These statements regularly include prior arrest 
information, opinions of guilt, confessions, and information as to prior convictions. 
Among the most frequent disseminators of prejudicial information to the media are 
law enforcement officers and prosecutors.2
 The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the 
“Model Rules”) were written as a standard of ethics that could be adopted by state 
bars or used as a guide to draft their own.3 In New York, the Model Rules were 
adopted in part and modified.4 The modifications are evident in both New York’s 
rule pertaining to trial publicity, New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6,5 and 
Local Criminal Rule 23.1, which is binding in the Southern and Eastern Districts of 
1. See, e.g., Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic 
Review, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 219 (1999).
2. Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological 
Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 
6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 677, 680 (2000).
3. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2009).
4. N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct (2009).
5. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.0, r. 3.6 (2009).
983
nEW yOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
New York.6 The variances in the New York and Southern and Eastern District rules 
from the Model Rules governing trial publicity have opened the door for New York 
prosecutors to infringe on the protections provided to defendants by the Sixth 
Amendment.
 My perspective on the disadvantage of the defense and the high-profile criminal 
defendant is best articulated according to the following structure. In Part II, this 
article discusses the history of the media-trial relationship, dating back from the 
Norman Conquest in 1066 through present day, and will examine cases such as 
United States v. Burr, United States v. Hauptmann, and People v. Simpson. Part III of 
this article considers social science studies and research, as well as arguments on 
both sides of the debate over the effect of the media on juror impartiality. In Part IV, 
this article provides an analysis of how the ethical and local rules prevent defense 
attorneys in high-profile New York cases from effectively addressing the media bias 
that is faced before and during the courtroom trial. And, in Part V, this article 
provides a real-life example of how these issues arose during a high-profile trial: my 
representation of John A. Gotti III in his 2008 trial for conspiracy and murder under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In its entirety, 
this article seeks to advance, through an analysis of history, social science, and 
professional experience, the proposition that the defense, although protected in 
theory by explicit laws, remedies, and codes of conduct, is at an inherent disadvantage 
in the criminal justice system due to the greater protections afforded to the media 
and exploited by prosecutors.
ii. traCing thE histOry Of thE MEdia-triaL rELatiOnship
 In England, prior to the Norman Conquest in 1066, cases were brought before 
moots, and all freemen were required to attend in order to decide the cases.7 Over 
many years, the rules of the precursor to the jury system were relaxed; the moots 
remained open to freemen, but freemen were no longer compelled to attend.8 Despite 
the changes in legal procedures and criminal laws, criminal trials remained open to 
the public. This tradition of open court proceedings continued in the American 
colonies.9 Some of the colonies, such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, explicitly 
declared that all trials must remain open to the public.10 In both British and American 
6. S.D. & E.D. N.Y. Loc. Crim. R. 23.1.
7. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565 (1980). A moot, also known as a “hundred 
court,” was “a larger court baron, held for all inhabitants of a particular hundred rather than a manor, in 
which the free suitors were the judges (jurors) and the steward the register.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
381 (8th ed. 2004). Freemen were the free landowners of the hundred. 2 Frederic William Maitland, 
Outlines of English Legal History, 560–1600, in The Collected Papers of Frederic William 
Maitland 117, 426 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911). A hundred was an ancient English geographical division 
with its own court, similar to a modern day county. Black’s Law Dictionary 758 (8th ed. 2004). The 
last moot was abolished in 1971. Id. at 381.
8. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565.
9. Id. at 567.
10. Id. at 567–68.
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history, an open criminal trial has been treated as a presumptive, indispensible right.11 
However, the media saturation that exists in modern-day America certainly did not 
exist in the American colonies.
 A. United States v. Burr
 It was only a few years after the signing of the U.S. Constitution that the young 
United States experienced its first “media circus” trial.12 This early example of the 
media’s impact upon a criminal trial (and the court’s attempt to protect the defendant 
from such inf luence) occurred in the 1807 trial of former Vice President Aaron 
Burr.13 Burr was charged with treason after his alleged plans to seize New Orleans 
and conquer Mexico were revealed to the public.14 During the time leading up to the 
trial, Virginia newspapers covered in detail both the investigation and Burr’s alleged 
plan to build his own empire.15 The press claimed that Burr had intended to form his 
own empire by invading Mexico and then joining it with what was then the 
southwestern United States.16 Burr’s political status and the nature of the charges 
against him set the stage for massive media attention.17 There developed a fear that 
the immense public exposure to potential evidence would prevent Burr from being 
tried by a fair and impartial jury in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.18 U.S. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall presided over the case and struggled 
with this question.19 Marshall understood that a person’s belief in his own ability to 
judge a set of facts in a fair and impartial manner should not be dispositive of the 
question as to whether media exposure compromised a sitting jury. Chief Justice 
Marshall explained:
[A juror] may declare that notwithstanding these prejudices he is determined 
to listen to the evidence, and be governed by it; but the law will not trust 
him. . . . Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony, 
but the law suspects him, and certainly not without reason.20
11. Id. at 569 (“[C]riminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open. This is no quirk 
of history; rather, it has long been recognized as an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.”).
12. See Rich Curtner & Melissa Kassier, “Not in Our Town”: Pretrial Publicity, Presumed Prejudice, and 
Change of Venue in Alaska: Public Opinion Surveys as a Tool to Measure the Impact of Prejudicial Pretrial 
Publicity, 22 Alaska L. Rev. 255, 257 (2005).
13. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g); see Curtner & Kassier, supra note 
12, at 257–58.
14. See Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Cases of National 
Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless Wrong, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 39, 48–49 (1996).
15. See Curtner & Kassier, supra note 12, at 257.
16. Id.
17. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 14, at 48–49.
18. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50–51.
19. See id. 
20. Id. at 50.
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In the end, Marshall ruled that mere exposure to the pretrial publicity was not, in 
and of itself, enough reason to dismiss a juror, but if that juror could not leave behind 
his “strong and deep impressions” in order to fairly “weigh the testimony” and 
evaluate the evidence presented during the trial, then that juror could be disqualified.21 
On the first day of voir dire, Marshall was forced to dismiss forty-four of forty-eight 
potential jurors, deeming them prejudicially influenced by the newspapers’ pretrial 
publicity.22 Burr was eventually acquitted of treason but convicted on the charge of 
providing the means for a military expedition against a nation with which the United 
States was at peace.23
 B. State v. Hauptmann
 Although Burr had to cope with the newspapers’ intense scrutiny, he was 
fortunate enough to not have been surrounded by cameras. Bruno Hauptmann, 
however, was not so lucky. The mass media’s infatuation with criminal trials first 
presented itself with his 1935 trial for the kidnapping and murder of Charles 
Lindbergh’s baby (commonly referred to as the Lindbergh baby case).24 Lindbergh’s 
fame, the nature of the crime, and advances in camera and recording technology led 
to a trial controlled more by the media than by the judge. Prior to Hauptmann’s 
arrest, the media followed every break in the police investigation and consistently 
reported on its progress.25 After Hauptmann’s arrest, approximately 700 reporters, 
including 120 cameramen, descended and converged upon the Flemington, New 
Jersey courthouse.26 The photographers used blinding f lashbulbs for pictures and 
climbed over defense and prosecution tables during the proceedings.27 The unusually 
large number of reporters created an intense competition to get better pictures and 
stories. The judge had no choice but to order the prohibition of cameras in the 
courtroom.28 In response, and in disregard of the judge’s order, photographers used 
21. Id. at 51.
22. See Curtner & Kassier, supra note 12, at 258.
23. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 207.
24. David A. Harris, Essay, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public 
Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 785, 798 (1993).
25. See Oscar Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 453, 460 
(1940).
26. Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In Furtherance of the Public’s First 
Amendment Rights, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1519, 1521 n.7 (1996).
27. Id.
28. See Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Story Behind the Adoption of the Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 Judicature 
14, 18–19 (1979) (explaining that the judge presiding over Hauptmann’s trial initially allowed limited 
camera coverage of the proceedings but, after discovering multiple violations of his orders, revoked the 
right to photographic coverage of any type in the courtroom).
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concealed cameras to take pictures and news footage of witnesses and the proceedings 
while trial was in session.29
 On appeal, Hauptmann raised the issues of pretrial prejudice due to media coverage 
and prejudice suffered from the “confusion and disorder ‘reigning’ in the court room, 
viz., running about of messenger boys and clerks employed by the press.”30 First 
addressing the pretrial prejudice, the New Jersey Appellate Court found Hauptmann’s 
argument untenable: “If the result of an important murder trial is to be nullified by 
newspaper stories and radio broadcasts, few convictions would stand.”31 It appears that 
the court agreed with Hauptmann’s claim that the pretrial publicity may have prejudiced 
his case, but then decided that a reversal on such ground was unwarranted and would 
lead to mass reversals of criminal cases.32 The court also slightly acknowledged the 
chaos in the courtroom, but found both that the trial court judge handled it appropriately 
and that Hauptmann failed to preserve the issue for appeal:
 Without doubt there were messengers going to and fro. Again, it was 
inevitable. The press and public were entitled to reports of the daily 
happenings, and it was quite proper for the trial judge to afford reasonable 
facilities for sending such reports. During the trial, the court seems to have 
taken proper action of its own motion to preserve order, and to have responded 
properly to any suggestions in that regard. No motion for mistrial or for a new 
trial on this or any other ground is claimed to have been made.33
However, the Appellate Court failed to specifically address both the reporters 
climbing over tables and the use of f lashbulbs.34
 The media circus created by the Lindbergh baby case prompted the American 
Bar Association (ABA) in 1937 to create Canon 35 of the ABA Canons of Judicial 
Ethics (“Canons”), recommending a ban on the use of all cameras in the courtroom.35 
A special committee was appointed to investigate the media’s interference with the 
Lindbergh baby trial and concluded that “photography . . . has a tendency to distract 
the attention of the participants in a trial from the single object of a trial, to wit, to 
do justice between the parties before the court.”36 In 1952, Canon 35 was amended to 
29. See id.; Gregory K. McCall, Note, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 
Colum. L. Rev. 1546, 1547 (1985).
30. State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809, 827 (N.J. 1935).
31. Id. at 828.
32. See id. at 828–29.
33. Id. at 827.
34. See id.; see also Ruth Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical 
Perspective, 78 Judicature 128, 130 (1994). Despite the media circus surrounding the trial, Hauptmann 
was convicted, sentenced to death, and eventually executed. 6 West’s Encyclopedia of American 
Law 329 (2d ed. 2005). 
35. Sager & Frederiksen, supra note 26, at 1521 n.8.
36. Report of the Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio and Bar, as to Publicity Interfering with 
Fair Trial of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 63 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 382, 385 (1938); McCall, supra 
note 29, at 1548.
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bar television coverage of federal court proceedings and to ban photography and 
broadcasts of state trials.37 When the Canons were replaced with the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct in 1972, the ABA loosened the rule to allow photography and the 
recording of trials in limited circumstances for educational purposes only.38 The 
restrictions were further relaxed in 1978 when the ABA allowed courtroom coverage 
by electronic media if it was conducted without interfering with the trial.39 The 
ramifications of these restrictions are explored in greater detail in Part IV.
 After the Lindbergh baby trial, there continued to be an increase in dissemination 
of information about criminal trials. Newspapers and radio stations increased their 
coverage of local trials, turning them into national news.40 In my opinion, the rise of 
television placed substantial burdens on the courts’ ability to empanel and maintain 
an impartial jury. It is standard for judges to instruct jurors not to watch or read the 
news or conduct any independent research about the trial at hand. Beyond the rapid 
distribution of print media reports of investigations and trials, television brought 
damaging footage (e.g., suspects in handcuffs, f lashing police lights, and crime scene 
ribbon) into the living room. This imagery in motion presented a danger of prejudice 
distinct from the limited portrayals in newspapers and radio.
 C. Rideau v. Louisiana
 In Rideau v. Louisiana, the defendant Wilbert Rideau was charged with robbing 
a bank, kidnapping bank employees, and killing one of those employees.41 Rideau 
was arrested hours after the crimes were committed and detained in Calcasieu Parish 
jail in Lake Charles, Louisiana.42 Shortly after his arrest, the Sherriff of Calcasieu 
Parish recorded a twenty-minute “interview” with Rideau wherein Rideau confessed 
to the crimes alleged against him.43 Over the following days, a local television station 
broadcasted the footage of the confession on three separate occasions.44 The total 
viewership of the three broadcasts was approximately 97,000 people; Calcasieu Parish 
had an approximate population of 150,000.45 The trial court denied Rideau’s motion 
for a change of venue, and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.46 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the refusal to grant Rideau’s motion 
37. Sager & Frederiksen, supra note 26, at 1521 n.8.
38. Id.
39. See id.; Book Note, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 977, 978 (1985) (reviewing J. Edward Gerald, News of Crime: 
Courts and Press in Conflict (1983)).
40. See Curtner & Kassier, supra note 12, at 262–63.
41. 373 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1963).
42. Id. at 724.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 724–25.
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for a venue change constituted a denial of Rideau’s due process rights because the 
jury pool from the parish had been repeatedly exposed to Rideau’s confession of the 
crimes with which he was subsequently charged.47 Rideau’s “real” trial had occurred 
outside the courtroom, in the media and in the court of public opinion.48 The Court 
reversed Rideau’s conviction.49 The dissenters agreed with the majority that a 
defendant can be “deprived of due process of law when he is tried in an environment 
so permeated with hostility that judicial proceedings can be ‘but a hollow formality,’” 
but disagreed with the majority’s application of the presumed prejudice.50 The dissent 
instead would have required the defendant to demonstrate prejudice with proof of a 
“substantial nexus between the televised ‘interview’ and petitioner’s trial” to warrant 
a reversal.51
 D. Estes v. Texas
 The Court’s decision in Rideau addressed only the issue of the prejudicial effect 
of publicity prior to any court proceeding. Two years later in Estes v. Texas, the U.S. 
Supreme Court tackled the issue of the prejudicial effect of media coverage in the 
courtroom.52 Defendant Billy Sol Estes moved to bar photography, television 
broadcasting, and radio broadcasting from the trial proceedings.53 The trial court 
denied his motion,54 and the initial proceedings were broadcasted live via television 
and radio.55 Estes was eventually convicted on charges of swindling. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction in a 5-4 decision.56 In Estes’s motion to the 
Court, he cited Canon 35 of the Canons, not as law, but as evidence of the disapproval 
of the legal community of televised broadcasts.57 The Court described the chaotic 
scene of the trial courtroom: “[A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom 
throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. 
Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were 
on the judge’s bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel table.”58 
The Court determined that these factors “led to considerable disruption of the 
47. Id. at 726.
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 727.
50. Id. at 729–33 (Clark, J., dissenting); Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 14, at 54–55.
51. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 729 (Clark, J., dissenting).
52. 381 U.S. 532, 534–35 (1965).
53. Id. at 535.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 536.
56. See id. at 532–35.
57. Id. at 535.
58. Id. at 536.
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hearings.”59 While the Court acknowledged that a claim of a violation of due process 
typically requires a showing of identifiable prejudice, it found that sometimes “a 
procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result 
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.”60
 As in Rideau, the Court held that identifiable prejudice was not required to show 
a due process violation when a basis for appeal involved taint from the media and, 
specifically, television.61 The Court expressed four specific concerns about televised 
proceedings: (1) the impact on the jurors, (2) the impairment of testimony, (3) the 
additional responsibilities placed upon the judge, and (4) the impact upon the 
defendant.62 The Supreme Court was concerned that the jurors would not only be 
tainted by the negative publicity, but also distracted by all the media attention.63 It 
explained that witnesses may behave differently when aware of the broadcast, thereby 
affecting their credibility and impeding their willingness to testify about embarrassing 
or painful information.64 In addition, the Court held that the added distraction of 
the cameras and the extra responsibility of controlling their use would inhibit a judge 
from ensuring a fair trial.65 Finally, the Justices wanted to avoid “[t]rial by television” 
and felt that a defendant may be unable to concentrate on his own trial if faced with 
intense in-court media scrutiny.66 Notwithstanding the Court’s decision, it left open 
the possibility of a different outcome when technology had advanced: “When the 
advances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without 
their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.”67
 E. Sheppard v. Maxwell
 A year later in the case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, in an 8-1 decision, the Supreme 
Court overturned the conviction of Sam Sheppard for second-degree murder in his 
wife’s death, based on the prejudice he suffered from the negative publicity 
surrounding the case.68 Following the line of reasoning used in Rideau and Estes, the 
Court again did not require the defendant to show that he had suffered identifiable 
prejudice.69 Instead, the Court explained that it could find, on a case-by-case basis 
59. Id.
60. Id. at 542–43. One could only imagine what the Court would have found if faced with the Lindbergh 
baby case after its decision here. See discussion infra Part II.B.
61. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542–43.
62. Id. at 545–50.
63. Id. at 545–46.
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id. at 548.
66. Id. at 549.
67. Id. at 540.
68. 384 U.S. 333, 335, 363 (1966).
69. Id. at 352.
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and when considering the totality of the circumstances, that prejudice probably 
existed—in such situations, the defendant need not prove identifiable prejudice.70 
The Court acknowledged the freedom of the press under the First Amendment, but 
found the trial court had taken insufficient steps to prevent and minimize the 
prejudicial effects of the media.71 The Court listed nine “f lagrant episodes” where 
the defendant was prejudiced by media exposure ranging from the media 
accompanying the jury on a visit to the crime scene to denials of motions for venue 
change and continuances.72 Applying a totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the 
Court held that the Sheppard case was even more egregious than the Estes case and 
that the trial judge’s “suggestions” and “requests” in Sheppard that the jury avoid the 
publicity of the trial were woefully inadequate.73 Furthermore, the Court held that 
the trial judge had made no attempt to protect the jury from the press, and as a 
result, the jury received anonymous letters to their home addresses and direct requests 
for statements regarding the trial from the press.74
 F. Chandler v. Florida
 Fifteen years later, in Chandler v. Florida, the Supreme Court would fulfill its 
own prediction in Estes by finding that new advances in technology and changes in 
the public perception of television gave reason to no longer presume prejudice from 
the mere broadcasting of a trial.75 At the time of the decision, twenty-eight states 
allowed for televised coverage of some court proceedings and twelve more states were 
taking the issue under consideration.76 Gone were the blinding lights, bulky cameras, 
and long twisting cables that marred the Estes and Hauptmann trials. The Court 
limited the holding in Estes to its facts and held that there must be a showing of 
actual prejudice; it would no longer presume prejudice.77
 The Chandler decision left open the possibility for increased television broadcasting 
of criminal trials. One of the f laws of television news coverage of trials was that they 
often “suffer from incompleteness. . . . [in that] the public seldom sees more than a 
fraction of actual trial proceedings.”78 The founding of Court TV in 199179 provided 
70. Id. at 351–52.
71. See id. at 350, 361– 63.
72. Id. at 345–49. 
73. Id. at 353.
74. Id.
75. 449 U.S. 560, 576 & n.11 (1981).
76. Id. at 565 n.6; Sager & Frederiksen, supra note 26, at 1526.
77. See Chandler, 449 U.S. at 573–75, 581; id. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 587 (White, J., concurring).
78. Harris, supra note 24, at 811.
79. Court TV changed its name to truTV in 2008 and changed its format by adding shows beyond criminal 
trials. See Anne Becker, Court TV to Ditch Name, Change Programming in Rebrand, Broadcasting & 
Cable (Mar. 13, 2007, 5:05 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/108105-Court_TV_To_
Ditch_Name_Change_Programming_in_Rebrand.php.
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a more accurate examination of criminal trials by showing the cases almost in their 
entirety rather than selecting the most interesting and controversial segments and 
cutting them down to a twenty-second sound bite.80 Court TV stated that it served 
two educational purposes: (1) inspiring confidence in the result of the trial 
broadcasted, and (2) educating the public about the inner workings of the legal 
process.81 The network received an early break when, only a few months after its 
founding, it offered full coverage of the rape trial of William Kennedy Smith.82 The 
combination of the nature of the crime and a Kennedy defendant created significant 
public interest, allowing the station to capitalize on its exclusive ability to broadcast 
the trial in full.83 Five years later, Court TV was accessible to twenty million viewers 
and had broadcasted over 340 trials.84 One trial in particular captured the attention 
of the country: the O.J. Simpson murder trial.85
 G. People v. Simpson
 The O.J. Simpson case in 1995 exhibited a perfect storm of factors to mark it as 
a notorious and high-profile criminal trial. The defendant was a celebrity athlete, the 
crime was a double murder, a high-speed chase captivated a nation, and there were 
racial undertones present.86 Prior to the start of the trial, four out of five attorneys 
surveyed felt that the publicity surrounding the case would interfere with Simpson’s 
right to a fair trial.87 During the trial, it appeared that everyone involved with the 
case was influenced by the presence of television cameras, including the presiding 
judge, Judge Lance Ito.88 Before the Simpson case, Judge Ito was a respected judge 
with a reputation for maintaining a control over his courtroom.89 Yet during the trial, 
Judge Ito played to the cameras and allowed the proceedings to become a media 
circus, taking the focus off of the purpose of the trial proceeding—to seek the truth.90 
80. See Harris, supra note 24, at 788.
81. Christo Lassiter, The Appearance of Justice: TV or Not TV—That is the Question, 86 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 928, 973 (1996).
82. See Harris, supra note 24, at 801.
83. Id.
84. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 928.
85. See Transcript of Verdict, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995), 1995 WL 
704381.
86. See Wayne J. Pitts et al., The Legacy of the O.J. Simpson Trial, 10 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 199, 199–201 (2009).
87. Nadine Strossen, Free Press and Fair Trial: Implications of the O.J. Simpson Case, 26 U. Tol. L. Rev. 647, 
647 (1995).
88. See, e.g., H. Patrick Furman, Publicity in High Profile Criminal Cases, 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 507, 526–27 
(1998).
89. Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 989, 1011 (1996).
90. See Frank Rich, Op-Ed., Judge Ito’s All-Star Vaudeville, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1994, § 4, at 17 (“Mr. Ito’s 
odd behavior in week one suggests a man who is not unmindful of the fact that his service in this trial is 
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The lawyers seized on Judge Ito’s lapse and used the media to their own advantages. 
For example, defense attorney Johnnie Cochran publically addressed rumors of plea 
negotiations.91
 Arguably, the attorneys in the case should not have used the media and should 
have acted appropriately in front of the cameras, but it is up to the judge to control 
his courtroom and the proceedings. Zealous advocacy should be rewarded, not 
punished. Some have argued, however, that the attorneys were not zealous advocates, 
but were showing off because publicity would help their business.92 Even if this is 
true, it is the responsibility of the judge to keep tight reigns on the attorneys before 
him. Judge Ito allowed the lawyers to make lengthy arguments and “to comment 
directly to the public.”93 The case needed a strong judge who could keep out of the 
proceedings any unnecessary use of the media. Instead, Judge Ito was “dramatically 
affected” by the cameras, and it showed through his lack of control over the trial.94
 The most unusual aspect of the Simpson trial was the acquittal, despite the media 
attention and television cameras. Simpson’s right to a fair trial was seemingly 
unaffected, at least as it pertains to jurors having a pre-disposition to convict when 
subjected to negative pretrial publicity.95 Although Simpson was acquitted in the 
courtroom, he was found guilty in the court of public opinion.96 His later conviction 
on unrelated robbery and kidnapping charges in 2008 may have been tainted by the 
perception by some that he had escaped a justly deserved punishment for the murders 
of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman thirteen years earlier.97 During voir 
dire in the 2008 proceeding, jurors were questioned extensively about their opinions 
on the 1995 murder case.98 Some of the audio recordings entered into evidence 
contained references to the previous case.99 The defense team argued that the 
prosecution and law enforcement officials were not interested in the substance of the 
actual charges, but only in “getting” O.J. Simpson.100 Further, they alleged that many 
more likely to render him ready for prime time than for the Supreme Court.”).
91. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 974.
92. Angelique M. Paul, Note, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials Teach Us Anything 
About the Real Law?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 655, 679 (1997).
93. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 975–76.
94. Allen, supra note 89, at 1015.
95. See Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 14, at 64.
96. Lassiter, supra note 81, at 974.
97. See State v. Simpson, No. C237890, 2008 WL 5129099 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2008); see also Lena 
Jakobsson, Notorious Past Tainted Robbery Trial, Simpson Appeal Claims, CNN.com, June 11, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/06/10/oj.simpson.appeal/index.html.
98. Steve Friess, O.J. Simpson Convicted of Robbery and Kidnapping, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/10/04/world/americas/04iht-simpson.1.16687098.html.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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of the witnesses involved were influenced by the chance to receive media attention 
for themselves.101
 The Simpson case had a great effect on the legal community and the public as a 
whole. It has forced many to reconsider the wisdom of allowing cameras in the 
courtroom.102 Accordingly, a consideration of how media coverage and advancing 
technologies affect a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and juror 
impartiality is necessary.103
iii. triaL pUbLiCity as it affECts jUrOr iMpartiaLity
 One protection most fundamental to the American justice system is that of a trial 
by jury, where a group of the defendant’s peers, drawn from the community, are 
called upon to render a fair and impartial verdict.104 In practice, jurors, like any other 
person, are susceptible to various external inf luences—the news media and other 
informational sources made available through contemporary technology has been 
increasingly inf luential in the way the general public, the jury pool, perceive and 
evaluate the facts and evidence of a trial. In my experience, the media’s dissemination 
of potentially inadmissible evidence, such as lie-detector results and prior criminal 
records, has a tendency to skew a juror’s impartiality. In turn, the struggle continues 
between two most basic liberties—the right to a free press and the right to an 
impartial jury.
 The Sixth Amendment protects the accused in a criminal proceeding by, among 
other things, guaranteeing the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury 
in the state and district wherein the alleged crime was committed.105 Simultaneously, 
the First Amendment guarantees the right to freedom of the press.106 Historically, 
there has been a palpable tension between the two amendments, ref lected in the 
earliest example of such conflict in the 1807 trial of Aaron Burr for treason and 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion stating that, “[w]ere it possible to obtain a jury 
without any prepossessions whatever respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
it would be extremely desirable to obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps impossible, 
and therefore will not be required.”107 Two centuries later, as evidenced by the highly 
controversial debate over where to conduct the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
for his alleged role in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, U.S. courts clearly 
101. See id.
102. See Paul, supra note 92, at 674.
103. Looking into the future, the next topic of debate pertaining to advancing technology might be a 
discussion over the merits of broadcasting criminal trials over the Internet because “the mini-industry 
that lives on these [notorious] cases promotes a demand for coverage in order to justify its own existence.” 
See Furman, supra note 88, at 518.
104. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
105. Id. 
106. Id. amend. I.
107. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50–51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
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still face the controversy created by the voluminous amount of information 
disseminated through the print, television, and electronic media.108
 More than ever, the information age has considerably broadened the reach of the 
news media, making it nearly impossible for the high-profile criminal defendant and 
the public to avoid information regarding the case. Without ever truly reconciling 
the conflict between an impartial jury and the freedom of the press, the fair trial 
issue fiercely pervades the criminal justice system. While the efficiency and speed 
with which information is disseminated in our society is certainly valuable, the 
validity of such information is often questionable.109 When the public is exposed to 
information that is incomplete, factually incorrect, or, even worse, purposefully 
manipulated, the knowledge gained is injurious to the judicial system. When jurors 
are selected from the same general public that is exposed to such tainted information, 
the defendant’s liberty and the court’s integrity are in jeopardy. As Chief Justice 
Marshall concluded in Burr, exposure to pretrial publicity may not affect every juror’s 
ability to fairly render a verdict.110 However, the quality and quantity of such pretrial 
publicity exposure is an issue that must be investigated before a person can be allowed 
to participate in the criminal justice system.
 A. An Analytical Review
 Not all media coverage is created equal. Certain stories affect people and potential 
jurors in different ways. This occurs because pretrial publicity can be factually or 
emotionally oriented.111 Publicity that is factually oriented is objective; it relates to 
facts such as a defendant’s criminal record or evidence gathered from the crime 
scene.112 Emotional publicity has a more subjective component and uses information 
that may arouse certain feelings toward the defendant, such as “hearing that a murder 
was carried out in a particularly violent and brutal manner.”113 Experimental research 
has also demonstrated the damaging effects of pretrial publicity. Studies have shown 
that both types of pretrial publicity are linked to a higher probability of conviction 
and cause a general biasing effect among jurors.114 In 1990, one study exposed mock 
jurors to various types of pretrial publicity in the form of simulated newspaper articles 
regarding a bank robbery before presenting participants with a videotaped trial for 
108. See Kenneth R. Bazinet et al., So Long, Terror Thug. White House Abandons Plan to Hold Khalid Trial in 
Manhattan, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 30, 2010, at 5.
109. See Anton Vedder & Robert Wachbroit, Reliability of Information on the Internet: Some Distinctions, 5 
Ethics & Info. Tech. 211 (2003).
110. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50–51.
111. See Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 2, at 679.
112. Id. 
113. Id.
114. See id. at 679–80.
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that robbery.115 Participants were presented with either high or low factually oriented 
publicity and either high or low emotionally oriented publicity.116 “Both types of 
pretrial publicity led to greater convictions, and judicial instructions to ignore the 
information were completely ineffective.”117 In a 1998 study, Wilson and Bornstein 
obtained similar findings regarding the effects of emotional and factual pretrial 
publicity.118 The study concluded that there was an overall biasing effect of pretrial 
publicity in written format.119 Both types of pretrial publicity produced similar levels 
of publicity-based biases against the defendant.120
 B. Effects of Entertainment Media
 While the news media provides jurors with information about particular criminal 
cases of newsworthy defendants, television dramatizations and other types of 
entertainment media also have the ability to mold the general public’s understanding 
of criminal law and the judicial process. As evidenced by the enduring popularity of 
television programs such as NYPD Blue and the Law and Order franchise, the public 
has an insatiable appetite for crime and trial dramas.121 In many ways, these programs 
function as makeshift educational sources by exposing the public to some of the laws 
and procedures surrounding the criminal justice system—information that would 
otherwise be unfamiliar to a majority of the population. While art may, at times, 
authentically imitate life, television drama is clearly no substitute for real-life exposure 
to and education about the law. As a result, people bring preconceived, entertainment-
based notions of the law and criminal investigations into the courtroom when chosen 
as jurors. This phenomenon, referred to as the “CSI effect” (named after the popular 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CSI )  television franchise), refers to the general effect 
of a fictionalized television program that causes the public to have distorted views 
and unrealistic expectations of forensic science and criminal evidence.122 The term 
first appeared in the public lexicon in a 2002 Time article.123 The phenomenon is not 
limited to those who watch CSI. Several other television shows “that center on 
115. See Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 
409, 415–20 (1990).
116. Id. at 415.
117. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 2, at 679.
118. See Jeffrey R. Wilson & Brian H. Bornstein, Methodological Considerations in Pretrial Publicity Research: Is 
the Medium the Message?, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 585, 595 (1998).
119. See id. at 595–96.
120. See id. 
121. NYPD Blue (TV Series 1993–2005), The Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0106079/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2011); Law & Order (TV Series 1990–2010), The Internet Movie 
Database, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0106079/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). The original Law & 
Order first aired in 1990, and the show lasted through May 2010. Id.
122. See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis 
in Criminal Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1335, 1337 (2009).
123. Id. at 1338 (citing Jeffrey Kluger, How Science Solves Crimes, Time, Oct. 21, 2002, at 36, 45).
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forensic science” have a similar subject matter and effect, “including Without a Trace, 
Numb3rs, Criminal Minds, N.C.I.S.: Naval Criminal Investigative Service, The Closer, 
Crossing Jordan, Bones, and The Evidence.”124
 Research on the CSI effect describes the cumulative effect of all of these types of 
television programs. The underlying premise behind the CSI effect is that jurors are 
inf luenced by these fictionalized portrayals when rendering a verdict.125 Whether 
this effect even exists, and if so, whether it renders more acquittals or convictions, is 
still debatable.126 There are various degrees of alleged effects encompassed by this 
theory. The most frequently raised question about the CSI effect is whether it has 
caused jurors to raise their expectations of forensic science in criminal trials as a 
result of information gleaned from fictionalized crime dramas.127 In my experience, 
and advanced by this article, the answer is an unequivocal “Yes.” Prosecutors may be 
adversely affected when this type of evidence is not admitted at trial. The CSI effect 
suggests that jurors are more likely to acquit defendants in cases where forensic 
evidence is lacking because they expect law enforcement to accomplish everything 
“as seen on TV.”128 Prosecutors may actually face a higher burden of proof if jurors 
equate them with the fictionalized characters they view on television.129 Conversely, 
this theory postulates that defendants are at a disadvantage because of the growing 
popularity of CSI and other crime dramas because they present the prosecutors and 
forensic scientists in a positive, heroic light and the defendants as the “villains.”130 As 
a result, real-life prosecutors may be given greater deference.131 Furthermore, if 
scientific evidence is in fact presented against a criminal defendant, the jurors might 
be apt to exaggerate its probative value.132
 It is important to note that the CSI effect relies on little empirical data and is 
primarily supported by anecdotal stories and surveys from legal actors and jurors 
after the completion of a trial.133 “For example, after the recent, well-publicized 
acquittal of Robert Blake, jurors complained about the lack of fingerprints, DNA, 
and gunshot residue—evidence not often available in criminal trials but frequently 
used on television.”134 Various research findings have confirmed that many jurors 
have difficulty discounting inadmissible evidence and external information in the 
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1339.
126. See id. at 1342–43.
127. Id. at 1343; see, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in 
Reality and Fiction, 115 Yale L.J. 1050, 1054–55 (2006).
128. See Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra note 122, at 1336.
129. See id. at 1343. This effect is referred to as the “strong prosecutor’s effect.” Id.
130. See id. at 1344.
131. Id. This is referred to as the “defendant’s effect.” Id.
132. Tyler, supra note 127, at 1068.
133. See id. at 1052–53.
134. Id. at 1053.
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context of a criminal trial.135 Therefore, while lacking empirical data with respect to 
the CSI effect, it is still possible to conclude that this sort of entertainment media has 
an impact on jurors.
 C. Available Remedies and Their Effectiveness
 There is great difficulty in determining whether jurors are capable of putting aside 
opinions formed by a media story to weigh a trial’s evidence in a fair and impartial 
manner. Opinions are the underpinnings of what creates a rational, reasonable person, 
and therefore putting aside opinions is an arduous task. Asking a juror in a high-profile 
case—who is often exposed to the media’s portrayal of a defendant before the trial 
begins—to render a verdict based exclusively on evidence presented at trial is a highly 
dubious task for the standard juror. In the words of one court, “[i]t is therefore quite 
proper, if not indeed required in some instances, to make the determination . . . [on a 
juror’s impartiality] solely on the basis of the pre-trial publicity which has 
undoubtedly . . . created a dominant sentiment of prejudice in the community.”136 
However, research suggests that, without sacrificing the freedom of press or the right 
to a fair trial, the media’s prejudicial effects on jurors may be limited.137 Accordingly, an 
appraisal of the remedies available to combat the media’s effect on juror impartiality is 
a necessary step in this article’s analysis.
 The voir dire process is the first step in ensuring that the most obviously biased 
jurors do not participate on the jury in a criminal trial. However, research suggests 
that many jurors are more affected by media coverage than they would admit.138 
Furthermore, another study has found that questioning potential jurors on their 
exposure to media coverage and the effects it may have on their ability or inability to 
render a fair verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court actually increases 
the damage of pretrial publicity.139 The voir dire process serves as a self-measurement 
of one’s own ability to be objective. Like all self-measurements, potential jurors may 
innocently or purposely alter their responses. Therefore, voir dire is best used to 
dismiss egregiously biased jurors, but does not prove helpful when deciphering less 
obvious effects of pretrial publicity.
 Because voir dire does not eradicate all juror bias, there are other methods 
available to mediate the problem of pretrial publicity. Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to transfer the venue of his trial if prejudice 
135. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine, In Search of an Anti-Elephant: Confronting the Human Inability to Forget 
Inadmissible Evidence, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99 (2008). 
136. United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 515 (E.D. La. 1968), aff ’d, 423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1970).
137. See discussion infra Part III.C.
138. See Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial 
Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 665, 668–69 (1991). 
139. See Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Pretrial Publicity: Effects of Admonition and Expressing Pretrial Opinions, 
3 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 255, 255 (1998). 
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against him impedes his right to a fair trial.140 To warrant change of venue under 
Rule 21(a), publicity must be “recent, widespread and highly damaging.”141 The 
proper test to determine whether a motion for change of venue under Rule 21(a) 
should be granted is not whether a jury can be impaneled on which no juror has been 
exposed to pretrial publicity or formed a tentative opinion about the case; instead, 
the test asks whether the jurors are capable of putting aside any opinion formed on 
the basis of pretrial publicity and rendering “a verdict based solely on the evidence 
presented at trial.”142 The rule implies a presumption that exposure to publicity is 
inherently damaging.
 A venue change would be most useful in situations where media coverage of the 
defendant’s case is localized within his own community but is not as prevalent 
elsewhere. During the trial of Timothy McVeigh for the Oklahoma City bombing in 
1995, the court granted his motion for a change of venue and ordered that the case be 
transferred out of Oklahoma City.143 In consideration of the 168 Oklahoma citizens 
who had lost their lives in McVeigh’s bombing attack on the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building, it would have been near impossible to find fair and impartial jurors 
anywhere in the country, much less in the city that was most affected by that 
tragedy.144 Clearly, in situations where the case receives national or global coverage by 
the media, a venue change would prove useless because the risk of pretrial publicity 
bias is not just limited to the defendant’s local community. There are some criminal 
cases that captivate the nation’s attention (e.g., O.J. Simpson’s criminal trial145) and 
make it impossible for the average person to avoid exposure to media coverage. Also, 
the Internet allows more people to be exposed to cases not within their venue. 
Therefore, whether a venue change may remedy bias is dependent on the extent of a 
case’s pretrial publicity or the profile of the defendant.
 Another available solution to combat pretrial publicity bias is to delay the trial by 
issuing a continuance. The objective is to delay the trial long enough for the publicity 
to subside and the bias to decline. Like a venue change, a continuance is warranted 
only if the pretrial publicity makes it impossible to obtain a fair and impartial jury.146 
One study has found that a twelve-day continuance is effective in remedying factually 
oriented pretrial publicity but has no effect on emotional publicity bias in potential 
jurors.147 These results suggest that emotionally charged news stories are more 
140. Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court must transfer the proceeding against 
that defendant to another district if the court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant 
exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there.”).
141. Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90, 93 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting 1 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 343 (4th ed. 2010)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
142. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 378 (8th Cir. 1976).
143. United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1474–75 (W.D. Okla. 1996).
144. See id. at 1474.
145. See discussion supra Part II.G.
146. United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 885 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
147. Kramer et al., supra note 115, at 431.
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memorable, and as a result the eradication of their effects is more difficult. However, 
twelve days is a shorter time span than the usual duration of a continuance.148 As 
such, the effectiveness of a continuance is still inconclusive.149
 Once a trial has concluded and jury deliberations begin, there are precautions the 
court can take to minimize the influence of inadmissible evidence on the verdict. 
First, some reformers have suggested that courts should write more simplistic jury 
instructions when describing the law and other legal vernacular to the jury.150 Studies 
have shown that simplified jury instructions have increased juror comprehension of 
the laws that they are instructed to apply.151 In fact, jury instruction was a pivotal 
issue in the O.J. Simpson trial. Vincent Bugliosi, a former prosecutor in the Los 
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, claimed that one of the reasons Simpson 
was acquitted was due to the jury’s misunderstanding of the law.152 Bugliosi points 
out that the jury was led to believe that, if there was a reasonable doubt as to any fact 
presented, an acquittal was warranted.153 The misunderstanding of such a basic legal 
principle exemplifies the importance of clarifying jury instructions, not only to avoid 
the outside influence of the media, but also to avoid the internal misunderstandings 
that might be prevalent within the courtroom.
 Another reform concept is to instruct the jurors on the law before and after the 
trial. This would ensure that the jury understands the legal principles surrounding 
the case, not just during deliberations, but throughout the whole trial. Several studies 
have been conducted in connection with pre-instruction, but the results are arguably 
insignificant.154
Smith . . . found that subjects who were instructed before and after the 
evidence answered 70% of the abstract comprehension items correctly, whereas 
subjects instructed only afterward answered 68% correctly. Heuer and 
Penrod . . . found a small difference in criminal cases between jurors who 
received preinstruction (mean of 6.9 items correct out of 9 possible, or 77%) 
and those who did not (73%) . . . . Finally, Elwork et al. . . . found that jurors 
instructed both before and after the evidence answered 69% of the items 
correctly (mean of 8.3 out of 12 possible), whereas after-only jurors had an 
accuracy rate of 67%.155
148. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 2, at 683.
149. Id. at 683–84. 
150. See id. at 699.
151. Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 
Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 589, 623 (1997).
152. See Vincent Bugliosi, Outrage: The Five Reasons Why O. J. Simpson Got Away with Murder 
213, 216 (1996).
153. See id.
154. See Lieberman & Sales, supra note 151, at 628–31.
155. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and 
Proposed Solutions, 6 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 788, 802 (2000).
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 Overall, while research does not strongly support pre-instruction of jurors, it 
does not explicitly render the practice meritless. It is of no risk to the administration 
of justice and could easily be implemented as a measure to somewhat minimize any 
outside influences.
 Currently, trial courts handle the mention of inadmissible evidence and other 
outside information in the form of admonitions.156 When the publicity surrounding a 
case is significant, the judge may caution the jurors to ignore the information 
completely.157 While some research suggests admonitions can be useful in minimizing 
the media’s effects, other more recent studies dispute that finding.158 One such study 
exposed participants to either factually or emotionally oriented pretrial publicity 
before administering jury instructions that either admonished jurors to disregard the 
publicity or did not instruct them to do so.159 The results demonstrated the instruction 
was ineffective at reducing the effects of both types of publicity.160 By understanding 
the nuances of admissibility in a criminal trial, the jury may be more likely to see the 
benefit in disregarding certain kinds of evidence.161
 Overall, the media, predominantly through information disseminated by the 
prosecution, not only provides factual information to the public but also preys on 
emotions, an effect which cannot be quantified. The intangibility of emotional and 
psychological effects makes it nearly impossible to completely diminish prejudice 
from society as a whole, much less eradicate it from jurors. As it appears from the 
research discussed, due to the intangible effects of emotionally charged pretrial 
publicity, the effectiveness of available counteracting procedures is difficult to 
quantify. As demonstrated, the social sciences have created a large body of work 
covering this subject; yet the conclusion remains that some questions surrounding 
the media’s influences on juries will never be answered. While the actual effect of 
the available remedies is perhaps unquantifiable, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
believe advantages are to be gained through them, whether real or imagined. Thus, in 
practice, that perception of practitioners will ensure the continued use of these 
measures, despite questions surrounding their effectiveness. In other words, no 
matter any actual advantage a “remedy” may provide, the parties seemingly accept 
the remedies just as they are defined. Their mere availability in some way gives the 
remedies credibility as providing an advantage if awarded.
156. In my experience, when inadmissible evidence is referred to in the presence of the jury, the court directly 
addresses the jurors and instructs them to disregard what they heard with respect to such inadmissible 
evidence.
157. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 2, at 684.
158. See id. at 684–85. 
159. See Kramer et al., supra note 115, at 409, 415–20.
160. Id. at 409.
161. Lisa Eichhorn, Note, Social Science Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 341, 353 (1989).
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iV. EthiCaL and disCipLinary rULEs
 An interesting dynamic in the debate over media coverage and juror influence is 
the interplay of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the New York 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Local Rules of the U.S. District Courts for 
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.162 Although the ethical guidelines 
and rules, as set forth in each, might seek to mitigate any pretrial release of prejudicial 
information, in my experience they in fact set forth bodies of rules that open the 
door for such foul play on the part of the prosecution while effectively restricting the 
defense. Accordingly, as abused by the prosecution, the First Amendment protections 
of the media, in combination with the ethical rules, are detrimental to the liberty 
interests of the high-profile criminal defendant. All too common is the press 
statement made by an ambitious prosecutor announcing that a criminal defendant 
has been brought to justice. Such statements are made both at live press conferences 
and in print, containing information that, in my experience, is prejudicial to the 
defense. What then ensues is often irreversible prejudice, where the defense is forced 
to seek the conventional remedies discussed herein, as effective or ineffective as they 
may be; in some instances, no remedy exists to cure the damaging information.
 The ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (“Model Rule 3.6”) and the 
New York Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (“New York Rule 3.6”), each with respect 
to trial publicity, mirror each other in part, permitting a lawyer to make “a statement 
that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the 
substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or 
the lawyer’s client” in order to and only as much as is required to “mitigate the recent 
adverse publicity.”163 However, New York Rule 3.6 differs from the correlative Model 
Rule 3.6 in one area of particular significance.164
 New York Rule 3.6 continues to identify the “character, credibility, [or] 
reputation . . . of a party” involved in the proceeding as subjects of statements that 
are likely to materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding, where Model Rule 3.6 
does not.165 New York Rule 3.6 is more closely tailored with the correlative Local 
Criminal Rule 23.1 in the Local Rules of the U.S. District Courts for the Southern 
162. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6 (2009); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.0, 
r. 3.6 (2009); S.D. & E.D. N.Y. Loc. Crim. R. 23.1.
163. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6(c) (2009).
164. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.0, r. 3.6 (2009).
165. Id. § 1200.36(b). Please refer to the following real-life example for the operation of this statute: The 
Kings County District Attorney is quoted in a Tuesday, February 10, 2009, article in the New York Daily 
News saying, in reference to the defendant, “He gained a reputation as someone who would sell to any 
body builder, weightlifter or athlete,” and “Dr. Lucente’s greed resulted in the tragic death of two 
people.” Scott Shifrel, Dr. Roid ’s New Emergency. Clinic Chief Tied to Finest RX Accused of Boosting 
Bodybuilders, Kickbacks, N.Y. Daily News, Feb. 11, 2009, at 18 [hereinafter Shifrel, Clinic Chief]. Both 
quotations speak directly to those material prejudices identified in N.Y. Rule 3.6. Unfortunately, the 
binding nature of Local Criminal Rule 23.1 did not apply. However, redeeming for the defendant, and 
to illustrate the vindictiveness of the statements made to the press, the defendant was offered a plea deal 
three weeks into trial where he plead guilty to one count of conspiracy and received probation. Scott 
Shifrel, No Jail Time for S.I. Doc Who Sold Steriods, N.Y. Daily News, May 13, 2010, at 20. The 
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and Eastern Districts of New York (“Local Criminal Rule 23.1”).166 Both New York 
Rule 3.6 and Local Criminal Rule 23.1, in my opinion, preclude the defense from 
mitigating the adverse effect that the combination of press protection coverage and 
public accusation and ridicule of the defendant has on the public, judges, jurors, and 
an overall fair trial. While Local Criminal Rule 23.1 does not bind lawyers involved 
in state litigation, New York Rule 3.6 details the minimum standard which a 
practitioner’s conduct should not only meet, but exceed in order to ensure the “law 
will continue to be a noble profession.”167
 Local Criminal Rule 23.1(a) states in pertinent part that a lawyer may not
release or authorize the release of non-public information or opinion which a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public 
communication, in connection with pending or imminent criminal litigation 
with which they are associated, if there is a substantial likelihood that such 
dissemination will interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due 
administration of justice.168
The effective elements of the rule are those that restrict. But, the ineffective and 
prejudicial elements are those that permit. Local Criminal Rule 23.1(e) capriciously 
identifies subject matters that do not have substantial likelihood to interfere with a 
fair trial when disseminated, including announcements of the facts and circumstances 
of arrest, physical evidence seized, and the nature of the charge along with the text 
of the charge and a further description of the offense.169 Inescapably, and in my 
experience, Local Criminal Rule 23.1 has an effect contrary to its stated purpose—
the avoidance of interference with a fair trial and prejudice to the due administration 
of justice—when it is contemplated in the context of the damage caused by the 
dissemination of public information, particularly the information that is allowed to 
be disseminated under Local Criminal Rule 23.1.
 The term “non-public” as used in Local Criminal Rule 23.1 qualifies the 
information precluded from release and further skews the rule in favor of the 
prosecution, which is permitted to release a public statement including allegations as 
mentioned above.170 In my experience, investigative agencies and prosecutor’s offices 
take full advantage of their ability to use press releases by stating verbatim the text of 
the indictment. The text of an indictment is not restricted to a restatement of the law 
and, in my practice, I have encountered indictments containing very detailed accounts 
of the allegations, worsening the prejudicial effect on the criminal defendant. 
Prosecutors and law enforcement officials also make publicly televised statements. 
indictment contained seventy-six counts of criminal sale of a prescription for a controlled substance. 
Shifrel, Clinic Chief, supra. 
166. S.D. & E.D. N.Y. Loc. Crim. R. 23.1.
167. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1200.0, r. 3.6 (2009).
168. S.D. & E.D. N.Y. Loc. Crim. R. 23.1(a) (emphasis added).
169. Id. R. 23.1(e).
170. Id. R. 23.1(a).
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Clearly, allegations are not equated with “opinions” that are prohibited from 
dissemination by lawyers in accordance with Local Criminal Rule 23.1.171 However, 
the prosecution need not opine as to the merits and quality of their case in order to 
impair the defense, as the damage is done under the very clear authority provided by 
Local Criminal Rule 23.1(e) through their mere releasing of statements about the 
crime alleged.
 Local Criminal Rule 23.1(e) does not, however, impose an absolute bar on 
comments from the defense. It permits “[a]n announcement, without further comment, 
that the accused denies the charges, and a brief description of the nature of the 
defense.”172 That which Local Criminal Rule 23.1(d) identifies as information 
precluded from dissemination is the very same information that, if disclosed, would 
provide the defense a fair chance of combating the incriminating effect of the 
prosecution’s statements about the defendant in the media trial: specifically, “[t]he 
identity, testimony or credibility of prospective witnesses” and “[a]ny opinion as to 
the accused’s guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the 
case.”173 A defendant’s protections under Local Criminal Rule 23.1 are de minimis 
when considered in terms of the protections it affords to the prosecution’s witnesses 
and the prosecution’s administration of justice free from prejudice.
 Prosecutors have very little to gain from violations of Local Criminal Rule 23.1 
because, as demonstrated above, their benefits come with compliance with the rule. 
However, the defense has much to gain by commenting within the scope of Local 
Criminal Rule 23.1 or even in defiance of its confines. The press itself is not confined 
by Local Criminal Rule 23.1, and if the defense were to divulge information in 
violation of the rule, the press would publish such violative disseminations.174 
However, in highly publicized trials, live television provides the only true outlet for 
the defense to effectively rebut any negative media attention and public accusation. 
Such statements are primarily made upon exit from the courthouse. Yet, if followed, 
Local Criminal Rule 23.1 bars the defense from using the same outlet (e.g., television) 
that is used by the prosecution to cause a deleterious effect on the defendant through 
the release of public information and denies the defense an opportunity to 
meaningfully rebut the allegations.
 Recognizing there may be times when Local Criminal Rule 23.1 is violated, in 
my experience, sanctions for violation of Local Criminal Rule 23.1 are seemingly 
unevenly applied to prosecutors and defense counsels. Punishment for violation of 
Local Criminal Rule 23.1 falls under the Local Rule of the U.S. District Courts for 
the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York 1.5 (“Local Civil Rule 1.5”).175 
Local Civil Rule 1.5 articulates sanctions for a violation of Local Criminal Rule 23.1 
that include letters of reprimand or admonition, censure, suspension, and even an 
171. Id. (precluding the release or authorization of the release of opinion).
172. Id. R. 23.1(e)(7) (emphasis added).
173. Id. R. 23.1(d)(4), (7).
174. See id. R. 23.1.
175. S.D. & E.D. N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 1.5.
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order of disbarment.176 Prosecutors, in what appears to be a façade of courtesy, are 
quick to send letters to defense lawyers at the first slip of the tongue by the defense, 
articulating the availability of the prosecutor’s remedy for when defense counsel 
allegedly impairs the fair administration of justice—the filing of a sanctions motion 
for violation of Local Criminal Rule 23.1. Many times, the judge simultaneously 
receives that same letter from the prosecution, notifying the court that, although no 
motion has been made, a violation of Local Criminal Rule 23.1 has occurred 
nonetheless. The defense lawyer, in order to advocate for his high-profile client, 
potentially faces disbarment under the very same rules that both permit the 
prosecution to exploit the media’s protections under the First Amendment and 
restrict the defendant’s free speech. The damage caused by the dissemination of 
public information and information permissible under Local Criminal Rule 23.1 is 
essentially irreversible, leaving the defense to seek a conventional remedy, such as 
venue change, or no remedy at all.
V. triaL pUbLiCity and thE triaL Of jOhn a. gOtti iii, a.K.a. “jUniOr”
 The notoriety of criminal cases is affected by the celebrity of the defendant, the 
nature of the crime, and the underlying social issues; but sometimes the defendant’s 
name alone is enough to generate a wall of photographers at the courthouse steps.177 
Some of the most prominent examples in recent history include the four trials of 
John A. Gotti III, commonly referred to by the government and the press as John 
Gotti, Jr., or simply “Junior.”
 Gotti’s father, John J. Gotti, Sr., (“Gotti Sr.”) rose to the position of boss of the 
Gambino crime family, one of the most powerful criminal syndicates in the country 
at the time, by assassinating its former boss, Paul Castellano, in front of Spark’s 
Steakhouse on East 46th Street in Manhattan in 1985.178 Gotti Sr. was f lamboyant, 
charismatic, and a media sensation. He escaped conviction in three separate trials, 
176. See id. R. 1.5(c).
177. A recent instance of a defendant claiming prejudice due to the notoriety of the case and extent of media 
coverage is that of Jeffrey Skilling, the former CEO of Enron. In Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2896 (2010), the Supreme Court held that pretrial publicity and community prejudice did not prevent 
Skilling from obtaining a fair trial. The Court found that Skilling did not establish that a presumption 
of juror prejudice or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him. See id. at 2920–25. Additionally, 
the Court held that the district court did not err in denying Skilling’s requests for a venue transfer. Id. 
at 2917. Skilling, despite the notoriety of Enron, was not a household name like that of John Gotti. In 
my review of the approximately five hundred juror questionnaires during the Gotti trial, the number of 
prospective jurors who were unfamiliar with the Gotti name was nearly nil. Gotti was a true high-
profile defendant, making the selection of an impartial jury all the more daunting. Skilling is a valuable 
test case in the ongoing tension between media trial prejudice and the defense because the defendant, in 
possibly the most highly publicized corporate criminal case in American history, sought a conventional 
remedy and was denied.
178. See Susan Heller Anderson & David W. Dunlap, New York Day by Day; Seeking Castellano’s Killers, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at B3; Editorial, John Gotti, Guilty at Last, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1992, at A28.
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each time leading to a f lurry of headlines and pictures.179 It was not until 1992 when 
his underboss—the second-in-line in the Gambino family, Salvatore “Sammy the 
Bull” Gravano—became a cooperating witness, that the government was able to 
convict Gotti Sr. This act of treachery in itself was tabloid gold; so were the nine 
days of testimony that followed.180
 Six years later, the Gotti name would again hit the front page when John A. Gotti 
III (“Gotti”) was arrested for various mafia-related crimes.181 Gotti later pled guilty 
and served approximately five years at the Raybrook Federal Correction Institute.182 
Shortly before his release, Gotti was indicted once again for mob-related activities.183 
He decided to fight those new charges. Gotti’s defense was that he had withdrawn 
from the conspiracy, i.e., he had removed himself from the Gambino crime family, 
when he pled guilty in his prior case.184 Since the statute of limitations for RICO 
conspiracy is five years,185 Gotti could be acquitted if he could prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence his withdrawal from the mafia. The case ended in a hung jury. The 
government tried the case two more times, but both ended in mistrials as well.186 
Finally, on October 20, 2006, acting U.S. Attorney Michael Garcia announced that 
retrying Gotti “is not in the interests of justice in light of the three prior hung juries 
in the case.”187
 However, two years later, in 2008, Gotti found himself under indictment yet 
again. This time, Gotti was indicted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Tampa, 
Florida.188 The court granted the defense’s request for a venue change and the trial 
was moved to the Southern District of New York, explaining as follows:
Although no verdict or other adjudication has occurred in New York with 
respect to the charged RICO conspiracy and, therefore, the bar of double 
jeopardy is unavailable to Gotti to defeat the Florida charge, the “convenience” 
and “interests of justice” provisions of Rule 21(b) decisively commend both 
179. See, e.g., Selwyn Raab, After 2 Trials, a Third Unfolds for John Gotti, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1990, § 1, at 28; 
John J. Goldman, Oft-Acquitted ‘Teflon Don’ Face Toughest Trial Crime, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1992, at A4.
180. Arnold H. Lubasch, Gravano Ends Testimony After 9 Exhaustive Days, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1992, § 1, 
at 29.
181. See Tracy Connor, Not-So-Jolly Goodfellas Cram Court, N.Y. Post, Jan. 22, 1998, at 16.
182. See Anemona Hartocollis, Social Club Decor Plays Role in Gotti Racketeering Trial, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 
2006, at B2; Anemona Hartocollis, Tape Shows Gotti Withdrew from Mob Life, Defense Says, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 8, 2006, at B2 [hereinafter Hartocollis, Tape Shows Gotti].
183. See Hartocollis, Tape Shows Gotti, supra note 182.
184. See Patricia Hurtado, In End, Charges Usually Stick; ‘Junior’ Spared for Now by Hung Jury but History Shows 
in Most Mob Cases Prosecutors Try Again—And Win, Newsday (New York), Sept. 26, 2005, at A12.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2006).
186. Anemona Hartocollis, A Second Mistrial for Gotti as the Jury Deadlocks, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2006, at A1; 
Timothy Williams, For the Third Time, a Jury Fails to Convict Gotti, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2006, at A1.
187. E.g., Alan Feuer, After 3 Tries to Convict Gotti, a Decision Not to Make It 4, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2006, at 
B3.
188. See United States v. Gotti, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
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the transfer of this prosecution to New York and the interruption of this 
attempt by the United States to pursue in Florida an indictment that results 
in material and unwarranted inconvenience and that stands athwart the 
manifest interests of justice.189
 This trial, like the others, was heavily covered by the media and often marred by 
false or prejudicial information released by the press. Gotti was originally charged 
with only one count of RICO conspiracy;190 yet the press reported that Gotti had 
been charged with three separate gangland-style murders.191 It is difficult to imagine 
anything more prejudicial than claiming a defendant has been charged with multiple 
murders when in fact the indictment clearly reads only one count of RICO 
conspiracy.192 Only a few weeks before the trial was to start, the indictment was 
superseded and two additional charges were added, both drug-related murders that, 
according to the press, Gotti had already been charged with; however he was charged 
with conspiracy to murder, not a substantive murder.193 There was a strong probability 
that the grand jury that returned the superseding indictment believed that, as a result 
of media reports, Gotti had already been charged with murder counts. This 
presumably made it less difficult for the U.S. Attorney’s Office to supersede the 
indictment.
 The murders alleged in the superseding indictment did not occur within the 
jurisdiction of the Southern District, where the trial was to be conducted, but rather 
in the Eastern District.194 Accordingly, and well within the scope of the federal rules, 
the defense moved to have the new charges tried in the appropriate jurisdiction—the 
Eastern District of New York.195 Despite the previous judge’s clear agreement with 
the legal argument presented by the defense in the initial venue change motion, the 
press put a negative spin on the new venue change motions filed in response to the 
prosecution’s improper choice of venue: one headline read, Team Gotti in Trial 
Hopscotch.196
 Before the trial began, it became clear that the media had determined Gotti’s 
guilt and had elected to ignore any positive information that came to light. In late 
June 2009, Gotti moved for a second time for release on bail.197 The memorandum 
189. Id. at 1271.
190. Id. at 1261 (“The indictment only charges one crime . . . .”).
191. See Elaine Silvestrini & Neil Johnson, Gotti Accused of Murder Conspiracy; State Also Indicts Tampa Man, 
Tampa Trib., Aug. 6, 2008, at 1.
192. See Gotti, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1261.
193. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gotti, 660 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 
S1-08-CR-1220 (PKC)), 2009 WL 5189884.
194. See Kirsten Fleming, Team Gotti in Trial Hopscotch, N.Y. Post, Sept. 2, 2009, at 27.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. After the venue transfer, his first attempt to receive bail was denied in January of 2009. See Thomas 
Zambito, No Bail, New Judge on Job as Feds Try Again to Nail Junior, N.Y. Daily News, Jan. 16, 2009, at 
26.
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that accompanied the motion was over twenty pages long and had multiple exhibits.198 
The press chose to focus on two small parts of the memorandum: Gotti’s grade point 
average in prison and his kidney problems.199 Media articles reporting on the 
memorandum often included snide, sarcastic comments such as the headline, He’s 
Gone from the Most-Wanted List to the Dean’s List.200 Missing were the extensive legal 
arguments and Gotti’s full compliance with previous bail conditions and court orders. 
Throughout this short news cycle, reporters, when questioning Gotti’s defense 
attorneys, focused their questions on Gotti’s health and intelligence, and rarely 
strayed into the subject of the merits of the bail application.
 Beyond the usual media publicity a high-profile criminal trial receives, various 
individuals used the Gotti trial to generate publicity through media controversy. 
Curtis Sliwa, a New York radio personality and founder of the Guardian Angels,201 a 
nonprofit organization with a mission of advancing public safety, is one such individual. 
Sliwa has a tarnished past with respect to generating publicity for himself and his 
organization.202 In previous trials, Gotti had been charged with ordering the 
kidnapping and shooting of Sliwa, but was never convicted.203 Throughout the pretrial 
hearings in the 2009 trial, Sliwa and usually three or four other Guardian Angels 
were permanent fixtures in the back of the courtroom. Sliwa made himself a target 
for questioning by the press and created media attention on his own. After a hearing 
on June 17, 2009, Sliwa claimed Gotti “eye-fornicat[ed]” him, pointed directly at him, 
and then told Sliwa that he was “going down.”204 Sliwa then claims he “flipped [Gotti] 
the bird” and cursed him out before storming out of the courtroom.205
 The reality of the matter is quite different. On the day in question, Sliwa was 
sitting in the last row of the courtroom and Gotti at the defense table. Gotti was 
surrounded by his attorneys, U.S. Marshals, court officers, an FBI agent, and 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys. None of these parties saw or were aware of any threat until 
after Sliwa made his statements to the press outside the courthouse.206 Logically, 
with all those people watching Gotti’s every move, especially the U.S. Marshals 
hired for that very reason, someone would have heard or seen the threat Sliwa 
198. Bail Memorandum, United States v. Gotti, 660 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08-CR-1220 
(PKC)).
199. See Bruce Golding, Gotti an Honors Student, N.Y. Post, June 30, 2009, at 21; Thomas Zambito, Oh, Gotti’s 
Aching Kidneys! Junior Sez Stone Agony ‘Worse Than Childbirth,’ N.Y. Daily News, July 8, 2009, at 21.
200. Golding, supra note 199.
201. See Laurie Goodstein, Guardian Angels’ Chief Clouds His Reputation; Sliwa Admits He Lied to Gain His 
Wings, Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1992, at A3.
202. See id.; Joe Treen & Maria Eftimiades, Tarnished Angel; Halo Askew, Guardian Angel Leader Curtis Sliwa 
Admits He Lied for Publicity, People Mag., Dec. 14, 1992, at 133.
203. United States v. Gotti, 457 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
204. Bruce Golding, Gotti’s Evil Eye—Sliwa Claims Death Threat in Courtroom, N.Y. Post, June 18, 2009, at 7.
205. Id.
206. John Riley, Sliwa Accuses Gotti Jr. of Threatening Him, Again, Newsday (New York), June 17, 2009, 
available at 2009 WLNR 11597037.
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described. The FBI agent, the court officers, and the prosecutors said they could not 
hear what Gotti said;207 but somehow, from a much greater distance, Sliwa claimed 
to hear perfectly and clearly. The defense attorneys explained that Gotti was telling 
his attorneys that he would meet them downstairs and had not addressed Sliwa at 
all.208 Even though many of the articles included the explanation from Gotti’s defense 
attorneys, the headlines and the majority of the content of the articles gave credence 
to Sliwa’s claimed witness intimidation.209
 Prejudicial media reports stemmed from and came during jury selection. Due to 
the notoriety of the case and the defendant, the voir dire process was arduous. 
Attorneys on both sides waded through over five hundred jury questionnaires. At 
the request of the government, the jury was anonymous, just like the three previous 
Gotti trial juries. The anonymous designation of the jury created an assumption that 
there was a potential danger to the jurors.210 To further complicate the process, jurors 
quickly learned that saying something disparaging about the defendant would get 
them excused from the case. The newspapers reported on some of these comments 
from jurors, further prejudicing the defendant. One prospective juror, commenting 
on his lack of desire to serve, said in the presence of other prospective jurors—and to 
the media’s delight—“[f]orget it, you’ll get a bullet in the head.”211 If the alleged 
necessity of anonymity was not enough to prejudice the jury, the comments from 
fellow potential jurors were.
 After the jury was selected, along with six alternates, the New York Daily News 
released a profile of each of the twelve jurors.212 The article published a chart that 
included each jurors’ gender, race, and occupation.213 The jury had already been 
warned about the importance of maintaining their anonymity throughout the trial, 
but after the publication of the New York Daily News article, their anonymity had 
been diminished. The need for anonymity may itself have intimidated the jurors; 
however, even if it had not, the removal of that protection may have triggered anxiety 
or intimidation.
 Even the jurors themselves created headlines. At one point during the trial, a 
juror had to be removed from the jury after claiming a near car accident was an 
207. Id.
208. Priscilla Ilarraza & Alice McQuillan, Sliwa Claims Gotti “Eye Fornication” in Court, NBC N.Y., June 18, 
2009, http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Sliwa-Claims-Gotti-Eye-Fornicaiton.html; Bruce 
Golding, Gotti’s Evil Eye—Sliwa Claims Death Threat in Courtroom, N.Y. Post, June 18, 2009, at 7.
209. See, e.g., Golding, supra note 208; Riley, supra note 206.
210. For a brief discussion of anonymous juries, see Ronald Smothers, A Mixed Verdict on Anonymous Jurors, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at E6.
211. Alison Gendar & Larry McShane, Judge of the Jury: Jr. Gotti’s Lawyers Listen When Boss Suggests Picks for 
Panel, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 17, 2009, at 4.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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attempt by the mafia to intimidate her.214 The juror claimed that a car nearly struck 
her after she exited a city bus, and that the incident was somehow related to the 
trial.215 After a series of questions, the judge determined that it was very unlikely that 
foul play had occurred, but agreed with the defense that it would be “safe” to dismiss 
her.216 While answering the judge’s questions and expanding upon her story, it was 
revealed that the juror was not injured, and had taken a bus route out of her ordinary 
course of travel—making it unlikely that there was any attempt to intimidate her.217 
To further contradict her alleged fear of intimidation, the person whose car almost 
hit her did not mention the trial and may have asked if she was all right.218 During 
the trial, the juror had been seen with her eyes closed on more than one occasion and 
the news accounts seem to imply that her “mishap” may have just been an excuse to 
escape jury duty.219 Although her fellow jurors claimed she did not share her account 
with them directly, it is not difficult to imagine that the media made them aware of 
the alleged jury intimidation. The court did not tell the remaining jurors why one of 
them had been dismissed, which may have caused them to create their own reasons, 
especially after listening to cooperating witnesses testify about how they had 
tampered with juries in previous organized crime trials.
 Unfortunately, that was not the end of the jury-created headlines. Further into 
the trial, a letter to the judge from an anonymous juror claimed that juror number 
seven did not get along with the other jurors, was intending to intentionally delay 
deliberations, and was infatuated with one of the defense attorneys.220 Two of New 
York City’s largest newspapers, the New York Daily News and the New York Post, 
made copies of the letter available on their websites.221 Perhaps most disturbing about 
the letter was that the writer, allegedly a jury member, had confused one of the 
defense attorney’s names with that of a high-profile, recently convicted mafia 
hitman.222 Gotti said, in an off-the-cuff comment to radio producer Frank Morano, 
214. Alison Gendar & Larry McShane, Ya Gotti Go, Judge Tells Antsy Juror, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 14, 2009, 
at 3.
215. Id. 
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The author observed these statements by the juror firsthand during the trial proceedings.
219. See Gendar & McShane, supra note 214 (stating that juror number three was “ jumpy” after the incident, 
and that, “[a]t several points during the trial, she was spotted with her eyes closed in the juror box—
prompting Castel to instruct jurors to ‘get up and stretch’”).
220. See Alison Gendar & Larry McShane, Junior’s Circus. Infighting Among Junior Gotti Jurors as Anonymous 
Snitch Reveals Chaos, N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 28, 2009, at 2; Bruce Golding, Diva Juror at Gotti Trial, 
N.Y. Post, Oct. 28, 2009, at 5.
221. See Letter from A Concerned Juror to Hon. P. Kevin Castel, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of N.Y. (Oct. 
25, 2009), http://www.nypost.com/r/nypost/2009/10/27/news/media/Gotti_juror_letter.pdf; id., http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/galleries/gotti_jurors_letter_to_the_judge/gotti_jurors_letter_
to_the_judge.html.
222. See letter cited supra note 221.
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an avid observer of Gotti’s three prior trials, “The juror thinks the guy who represents 
me is a five-time murderer! What shot do I have?”223 Apparently, either the juror 
thought that Gotti’s attorney was a convicted murderer or the juror did not pay close 
attention to the trial testimony. Either way, the impact would have a negative effect 
on the juror’s perception of Gotti. When questioned about any possible violations of 
juror number seven’s oath, only one juror indicated that it was possible: “Maybe . . . . 
I think if someone talks to her about it on the outside, they may bring information to 
her about what they heard.”224 After the judge individually questioned each juror, he 
declined to dismiss any at that time.
 The infighting among the jurors did not end there. The anonymous letter to the 
judge appeared to further deteriorate the already acrimonious relationship among 
some of the jurors. Specifically, it seemed that juror number seven believed the letter 
was written by juror number eleven and made her disdain clear.225 She taunted juror 
number eleven by singing, “hater, hater.”226 As a result, the judge replaced both jurors 
with alternates.227 The removal of jurors, one accused of being sympathetic to the 
defense, caused Gotti’s mother to lash out against the judge and the prosecutors: 
“They’re railroading you! They’re doing to you what they did to your father! . . . They’re 
the gangsters, right there!”228 As Gotti attempted to calm his mother, she was quickly 
escorted out of the courtroom by family and U.S. Marshals.229 The jury had become a 
story unto itself. Apparently, some of the jurors were more concerned with each other 
and their public appearance than the actual trial and the media was more than willing 
to fuel the fire. The judge never mentioned the letter to the jurors, so presumably they 
were only made aware of its existence and contents through the media.
 Although the trial had many interesting moments, the tensest was an argument 
between Gotti and the prosecution’s cooperating witness, John Alite. Alite had just 
finished testifying about the strangling and murder of a young woman in a hotel 
room, claiming it was committed by one of Gotti’s uncles.230 During the cross-
examination, defense attorneys implied that Alite had been the true perpetrator 
behind the murder. At that point, the judge stopped the trial for a lunch break. After 
the jury left the courtroom, the U.S. Marshals began to escort Alite off the witness 
223. See letter cited supra note 221.
224. See Gendar & McShane, supra note 220.
225. Bruce Golding, Jury Mob Scene—Panelists Brawling Over Gotti, N.Y. Post, Nov. 3, 2009, at 19.
226. Id.
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228. See, e.g., Gendar & McShane, supra note 220; Jerry Capeci, Mama Gotti Blows Her Stack; Mob Big OK’d 
Hit on Junior, Huffington Post, Nov. 9, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-capeci/mama-
gotti-blows-her-stac_b_350005.html.
229. See Capeci, supra note 228.
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stand. Alite stopped right in front of Gotti and began to taunt him. Gotti responded 
by yelling, “You fag! . . . Did I kill little girls? . . . You’re a dog! You’re a dog! You’re 
a punk. You always were a dog your whole life, you punk dog. . . . You want to 
strangle little girls in a motel?”231
 After lunch, the judge conducted a short hearing to get to the bottom of the 
incident. Alite claimed that Gotti mouthed to him, “I’ll kill you,” prompting Alite to 
say, “You got something to say to me?”232 According to Alite, it was then that Gotti 
became vocal. Prosecutors told the judge that a U.S. Marshal witnessed Gotti mouth 
the threat to the witness.233
 The next day, both the New York Post and the New York Daily News had Gotti on 
their front pages with the quotation “I’ll kill you,” reporting the alleged threat as 
having actually occurred.234 Although the jury was consistently reminded not to read 
the papers or watch the news, it would have been very difficult for them to avoid the 
big picture of Gotti on every news rack in the city. A day later, a “knowledgeable 
source” leaked to the press that the prosecution was contemplating charging Gotti 
with witness intimidation,235 further tainting the jury. Approximately one week after 
that, the judge stated that he had requested the U.S. Marshals to conduct their own 
investigation of the incident and that the investigation revealed that none of the U.S. 
Marshals present that day saw Gotti mouth anything to the witness,236 casting serious 
doubt on the credibility of Alite and the prosecution. Unfortunately, few media 
outlets reported the judge’s findings, and those that did buried the articles deep 
within the paper; very different from the sensationalistic, front-page articles 
addressing the same occurrence. The damage had already been done. In the end, the 
case resulted in a mistrial, the fourth hung jury in five years.237
 Due to the anonymous jury, it is impossible to fully determine the effect the 
media had on the jurors and their decisions. Would the jurors who voted guilty still 
have done so if the prejudice from the pretrial and trial publicity did not occur? One 
thing is certain: the Gotti name sold papers, drew viewers, and created a media 
frenzy. The Supreme Court recently reasoned in Skilling v. United States, where a 
presumption of juror prejudice was at issue, that “[i]t would be odd for an appellate 
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court to presume prejudice in a case in which jurors’ actions run counter to that 
presumption.”238 The Court was referring to the fact that the jury in Skilling had 
acquitted the defendant on nine counts of insider trading.239 Such an assertion 
neglects the fact that even when juror prejudice is present, the defense may nonetheless 
overcome meritless or weak allegations. The case of John A. Gotti is a perfect 
example of the power of the media to distort the facts of a criminal trial, influence 
the public, and infringe upon a defendant’s right to a fair trial, even when the end 
result of the trial is favorable to the defendant.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 History reflects the progression of press coverage in all mediums, in and out of 
the courtroom and before, during, and after a trial. And, as evidenced in part by the 
popularity of television dramas, the public has a seemingly insatiable appetite for 
crime stories. The grand stage of New York provides the ideal setting for the country 
to tune in, whether the story is real or fictitious. New York also provides the ideal 
setting for the prosecution to “chip away at” the high-profile criminal defendant’s 
presumption of innocence by utilizing means of permissible press coverage, negative 
headlines, press releases, and public indictments. These practices inhibit the defense 
by creating a trial within the sphere of public sentiment, infringing upon constitutional 
protections fundamental to the American concept of a fair trial.
 The general public’s unfamiliarity with the intricacies of the criminal justice 
system unavoidably leads to its premature imposition of guilt on the defendant as a 
result of mere public accusation. Clearly, restrictions on what the defense lawyer is 
permitted to say publicly further exacerbate the issue and highlights the tension 
between two seemingly congruent First Amendment protections, press and speech, 
in so much as speech applies to adverse parties in litigation. Rare is the citizen who 
would argue that free press should not be just that—free reign to publish information 
the press deems newsworthy. But, as technology has advanced and press coverage of 
high-profile cases has increased to massive proportions, the prosecution’s ability to 
disseminate prejudicial information, when coupled with the protections afforded to 
the press, unfortunately comes at the cost of the high-profile defendant’s liberty.
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